The human voice conveys a variety of information about people's feelings, emotions and mental states. Some of this information relies on sophisticated Theory of Mind (ToM) skills, whilst others are simpler and do not require ToM. This variety provides an interesting test case for the ToM account of autism, which would predict greater impairment as ToM requirements increase. In this paper, we draw on psychological and pragmatic theories to classify vocal cues according to the amount of mindreading required to identify them. Children with a high functioning Autism Spectrum Disorder and matched controls were tested in three experiments where the speakers' state had to be extracted from their vocalizations. Although our results confirm that people with autism have subtle difficulties dealing with vocal cues, they show a pattern of performance that is inconsistent with the view that atypical recognition of vocal cues is caused by impaired ToM.
Introduction
Impaired Theory of Mind (ToM) has been described as one of the core deficits behind the communicative and social impairments in Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD). More specifically, by preventing access to the full range of mental states and efficient mindreading, a deficit in ToM would lead to abnormalities in social development, in communicative development, in empathy and in imitation, all of which require taking other people's perspective (Baron-Cohen, 1995 , 2000 . Deficits in ToM have been evidenced using a variety of techniques and tasks, including first-(Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985) and second-order false belief tasks (Bowler, 1992) as well as other tests designed for older and higher functioning individuals who typically pass standard false-belief tasks (Baron-Cohen, O'Riordan, Stone, Jones, & Plaisted, 1999; Happé, 1994) . Recent tests of ToM have concentrated on participants' ability to recognise mental or emotional states from information conveyed in the eye region or voice (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, & Jolliffe, 1997; Golan, Baron-Cohen, Hill, & Rutherford, 2007; Rutherford, Baron-Cohen, & Wheelwright, 2002 The understanding of feelings, emotions or mental states conveyed in the voice provides an interesting test case for the ToM account of autism. Indeed, these types of vocal cues are extremely diverse (for a review, see McCann & Peppé, 2003) and call up ToM to varying degrees, ranging from simple physical states -such as calmness or excitedness -that do not require any mindreading, to social emotions -such as embarrassment -that require first-order ToM, and even more complex cues -like irony -requiring a full fledged 2nd-order ToM. The ToM account of autism predicts that participants with an ASD will be more impaired as ToM requirements increase.
So far, however, this factor has not been controlled for and this might account for mixed results in the existing literature on vocal emotion recognition in autism. On the one hand, a host of studies highlight difficulties in detecting vocal cues to irony and sarcasm (Wang, Dapretto, Hariri, Sigman, & Brookheimer, 2001; Wang, Lee, Sigman, & Dapretto, 2006; Wang, Lee, Sigman, & Dapretto, 2007) , and in matching vocally expressed affects with a static or dynamic facial expression (Hobson, Ouston, & Lee, 1988; Loveland et al., 1995) or with line drawings of body postures and facial expressions (Hobson, 1986) . On the other hand, other studies show no deficits in recognising facial emotions (Buitelaar, Van der Wees, Swaab-Barneveld, & Van der Gaag, 1999; Grossman, Klin, Carter, & Volkmar, 2000) , vocal emotions (Boucher, Lewis, & Collis, 2000) , or in matching faces and voices in video segments (Loveland et al., 1997) . Within a single test, it was also found that some items trigger important differences between controls and adults with
